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Why the Bank of Canada should keep its inflation-targeting regime, but
adapt it to achieve some important gains.
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MONETARY POLICYThe current monetary policy agreement between the Bank of Canada and the Department of
Finance is set to expire at the end of 2011. Among the policy options under consideration is the
adoption of either a lower inflation target or a switch to price-level targeting. The recent financial
crisis provided a costly reminder that price stability does not necessarily guarantee financial
stability, and the Bank’s post-2011 mandate might include a role for asset market stability. This
Commentary offers an overview of the policy options now being contemplated for the renewal of
the monetary policy framework in 2011 and addresses some of the more technical issues related
to the post-2011 monetary policy framework.
While not ruling out bolder adjustments in the future, the author suggests a number of
improvements with modest upside but limited risk for the impending renewal of the monetary
policy framework. In his opinion, the long horizon to return to the target path required under
price-level targeting (PLT) makes it currently a very unattractive choice. Horizons of three years
(or more) strain accountability and require an enormous amount of confidence in the Bank by the
public. Rather than an “either or” choice, he believes the right strategy is to keep the current
inflation-targeting (IT) framework but to adapt it slightly to achieve some of the more important
gains available under PLT. At a minimum, he recommends the following steps be taken by the
Bank of Canada.
￿ Incorporate past deviations in choosing future inflation targets: The most important payoff
to announcing that future inflation targets will reflect past deviations from target is that it
could lead to a reduction in medium- and long-horizon inflation uncertainty.
￿ Announce the temporary adoption of PLT at the zero lower bound for the policy rate: If
the Bank does not move to a PLT framework entirely, then it should announce that it
would implement some sort of PLT if it ever hit the ZLB.
￿ Lower the inflation target: The Bank should move to a target of 1.5 percent over the next
renewal period, with the expectation of a further reduction in the target to 1.0 percent at
the subsequent renewal.
￿ Consider the credit cycle in choosing the policy rate: Regulation should be the first tool to
deal with the credit cycle, he advises. But markets evolve quickly, and the Bank might need
to stretch its flexibility under either IT or PLT on occasion and use its policy rate to help
moderate the credit cycle. 
Real-world experience with these measures will help us decide if we should move the inflation
target closer to zero or adopt more features of PLT into our monetary policy framework in the future.
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I
nflation targeting in Canada is
approaching its 20th anniversary.
The current monetary policy
agreement between the Bank of Canada
and the Department of Finance is set 
to expire at the end of 2011. What
comes next?
The set of choices under serious consideration for
the renewal in 2011 is fairly small. At its last
renewal, the Bank of Canada (2006) made it clear
that the choice was either to burnish the current
inflation-targeting (IT) framework or move to
price-level-targeting (PLT). Comments made since
by senior officers of the Bank have reaffirmed this
position. Although narrow, such a focus is
appropriate:
1 Canadians have been well served by
the Bank’s inflation-targeting framework,
2 and
there is no need to contemplate a radical departure
from current monetary policy procedures.
A proper comparison of alternative monetary
policy arrangements requires an explicit
description of the economy, complete with
statements about preferences, constraints, productive
opportunities, frictions, a long list of potential
shocks and their distributions, and the mechanisms
by which agents’ choices and expectations are
coordinated. One should then compare feasible
alternatives for the monetary policy regime using
the standard tools of welfare analysis. Although
some examples of specific environments and the
utility gains and losses of adopting different
monetary policy arrangements within these
environments are available, there is no generally
agreed-upon model of the economy. This makes it
difficult to operationalize a more serious approach
to comparing different monetary frameworks, as
one has to separate results that are specific to a
particular model of the economy from those that
are more robust. So, in this Commentary, I follow
a less serious approach. 
What can the Bank of Canada do to contribute
to the stability of income and prices, both in
normal times and at the zero lower bound?
What level of inflation can and should be
targeted, and how quickly should it return to
target after a shock? Can the framework
contribute to financial stability? To transparency
and accountability? Most of the discussion that
follows focuses on how well the IT and PLT
frameworks address these and other related
questions. I conclude with a short list of
recommendations for the post-2011 regime,
which include lowering the inflation target.
Medium- and Long-Horizon
Uncertainty about the Value of Money
In a world in which inflation is not fully
anticipated, shocks to inflation distort the real
incomes of creditors and debtors, the real wages of
workers and real profits of firms, the real value of
taxes paid, and the real value of government
revenues received. With volatile inflation, relative
price signals become noisy and the allocation of
resources suffers. Agents demand premiums to
bear inflation risk, and long-range planning is
rendered more difficult.
Inflation targeting provides an anchor for
inflation that helps reduce uncertainty about the
path of future price levels. This is one of its
greatest contributions to economic welfare. The
IT framework, however, is forward looking: in its
simplest description, bygones are bygones, and
Thanks to Philippe Bergevin, Thorsten Koeppl, David Laidler, David Longworth, Michael Parkin, Chris Ragan, Bill Robson, Nick Rowe,
Avery Shenfeld, Gregor Smith, and an anonymous referee for comments.
1 The literature on central banking investigates myriad monetary policy frameworks, including, among others, the gold standard and targeting
macro variables such as monetary aggregates, nominal income, and the exchange rate. In Canada, there is also a long standing debate about
the merits of monetary union with the United States. 
2 As Bordo and Redish (2005) note, “Inflation targeting has been broadly successful. Whereas in past decades monetary policy has been
controversial and has generated heated debate in the literature, today there is broad acceptance – possibly disinterest – amongst Canadians
about the conduct of monetary policy.”| 2 Commentary 319
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shocks that drive the price level above or below
the target are not offset. Over time, one can
expect the price level to drift away from the
deterministic path corresponding to the mean of
the inflation target, albeit in a direction that is
unpredictable ex ante. Technically speaking, the IT
framework can be expected to introduce a unit
root into the price level so that uncertainty grows
without bound as the horizon lengthens. Although
agents’ expectations of inflation far in the future
are correctly centred by the inflation target, multi-
decade plans still face considerable inflation risk.
Under price-level trageting, a deviation from
the inflation target must lead to a subsequent
reversal. So, in contrast to the behaviour under IT,
the tendency is removed for the path of the price
level to wander away without bound from the
initial deterministic target path. Confronting
long-horizon uncertainty in the price level, and
reducing medium-level uncertainty, is one of the
principal attractions of PLT.
But the Canadian experience with IT does not
display the sort of wandering in the price level
that one would expect according to the simple
story described above. A version of Figure 1
appears in many Bank of Canada publications 
and shows the behaviour of the inflation rate
(computed using the year-over-year growth rate in
the consumer price index, CPI) for each month
since 1996. Since the end of 1995, the inflation
target has been 2 percent. In broad terms, the
inflation process supports the view that the Bank
has achieved the goals of previous monetary
agreements: fluctuations of inflation have hovered
around the 2 percent target and have been
contained largely in the 1-to-3 percent range.
3
3 In the earlier years, the Bank put more emphasis on the band that ranged from 1 to 3 percent than on the centre of the band.








































Figure 1: Inflation, Canada, January 1996 – November 2010
Source: Statistics Canada.Commentary 319 | 3
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Figure 2 has received less attention. It compares
the evolution of the CPI price level to a price-level
path that grows deterministically at 2 percent,
which would be the target path for a PLT
framework with a 2 percent inflation target. The
similarity of the two price paths is remarkable.
4
Ex post, there is no evidence of a unit root in the
inflation process under IT in Canada. Instead,
there has been a strong tendency for the CPI price
level to behave as one would expect under a
successful PLT framework. Periods of below-
average inflation have been followed by periods of
above-average inflation in a way that the CPI
price-level path has stayed very close to the
deterministically growing 2 percent path and has
crossed it several times.
What is one to make of Figure 2?
On the one hand, medium- or long-horizon
deviations from the deterministic price-level path
have not occurred as one might have expected
under IT, and neither have the shifts in income
that would accompany unpredictable drifts in the
inflation process. Many of the theoretical benefits
of PLT have been irrelevant over the past 15 years. 
On the other hand, this behaviour of the price
level was largely unexpected. Agents probably did
not anticipate that the CPI price level would stay
so close to the 2 percent deterministic path and so
did not take advantage of this feature in their
planning – indeed, they might have tried to avoid
risk that was not there.
5
4 If I had picked an earlier start date, the graphs would look a bit different. Over the transition period from 1992 to 1995, inflation came in
significantly below target. But I attribute this to the Bank’s need to outperform its objectives in order to gain public credibility that it was
serious about targeting inflation after two decades of disappointment. It would have been a mistake to try to offset this initial episode of
below-target inflation soon after having sacrificed so much to earn the credibility. And after enough time passes, it is hard to make a case
against letting bygones be bygones. 
5 This is not to say that the ex ante risk was not higher than history would suggest. Indeed, the very process of renewing the monetary policy
agreement introduces medium- and long-horizon uncertainty. At any of the three renewals in 1998, 2001, or 2006, the inflation target of 2
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Figure 2: The Price Level, Canada, January 1996 – November 2010
Source: Adapted from Ruge-Murcia (2009), building on earlier work by Kamenik et al. (2008).| 4 Commentary 319
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Senior officers of the Bank of Canada, going
back to at least David Dodge (2005), have argued
that the past coincidence between the realized
price level and what one would expect under PLT
should not be extrapolated. There was no intent
on their part to be “closet” price-level targeters.
The initial response was that Figure 2 is a fluke, 
a somewhat unusual outcome not shared by other
IT countries such as Sweden and the United
Kingdom, and most likely the result of a lucky
sequence of shocks. I am confident that the Bank
of Canada’s Governing Council has not secretly
attempted to target the price level over the past 20
years. But one must wonder whether there is some
feature of the Bank’s IT framework that has
generated PLT behaviour, however unintentional.
The mimicking of PLT has persisted across three
different governors of the Bank and numerous
changes in the membership of the Governing
Council. If the historical pattern persists, we are
going to have to come up with a theory. And we
might have one already.
Murchison (2010) points out that, with
interest-rate smoothing, IT incorporates many
aspects of PLT. That is, if the Bank does not just
look forward in determining the policy rate but
displays some history dependence by trying to
choose paths for the policy rate that avoid large
changes, then the behaviour of the economy will
mimic in many respects what one would expect to
see under PLT. Murchison argues that interest-rate
smoothing introduces secondary cycles into the
inflation process. If a shock causes inflation to fall
below target, the policy rate will be maintained
below neutral until inflation moves above target.
This leads to an overshooting of the inflation
target that will partially, or even fully, reverse the
initial inflation shock. Since empirical estimates of
the Bank’s Taylor rule
6 fit better when one allows
for interest-rate smoothing, and it is built into the
Bank’s own ToTEM model (Terms-of -Trade
Economic Model), one can be pretty confident
that it is a feature of the current IT regime. So the
similarity of the price level over the past 15 years
to what one would have expected under PLT
might not have been guaranteed, but might have
been much more likely than the simplest story
about how IT works would lead one to expect.
7
To gain the full benefits of the similarity to PLT
illustrated in Figure 2, agents have to believe that
the past 15 years were not a fluke and that they
can expect the realized price-level path to continue
to cross the path corresponding to its expected
value. To achieve this, the Bank of Canada will
have to explain why its framework can be relied
upon to generate a path for the price level that
looks like Figure 2. And by drawing attention to
this behaviour, the Bank will have to assume some
responsibility for realizing the public’s expectations
about the long-horizon predictability of the path
of the price level. 
Just as the behaviour of the price level under IT
in Canada challenges the simplest description of
how it should work, I expect the same would be
true under PLT, negating some of its anticipated
potential gains. While PLT should produce a
better anchor with which to reduce medium- and
long-horizon price-level uncertainty, in practice
there would still be tail risk. Small short-run and
medium-horizon deviations in the price level from
target reasonably could be expected to be offset in
a PLT framework. But some large movements in
the price level could still occur that would require
such an enormous response that one could make a
good argument that they should not be offset. For
example, does anybody really think that a central
bank should generate a deflation to offset the sort
of hyperinflation seen in Zimbabwe? Less
dramatically, history supports the view that a large
inflation caused by, say, the need to finance a war,
should lead to a reset of the price-level-target path.
Although we strive to avoid some contingencies,
they can and do happen even to serious countries
with serious central banks. Two recent examples
6 The Taylor rule, suggested by John B. Taylor, sets the overnight rate at 2 percent (the neutral real rate) plus the inflation rate, plus a linear
combination of two gaps: the output gap (real GDP minus potential GDP) and the inflation gap (the inflation rate minus the inflation target). 
7 At a conference held at the Bank of Canada in November 2010, a senior official indicated that the fluke hypothesis was losing credence at
the Bank and that the history-dependence story was being given more serious consideration.Commentary 319 | 5
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are telling. The Bank of England currently is
battling a deep recession, and inflation in the
United Kingdom has regularly breached the
central bank’s 3 percent upper bound. If inflation
persists above target and it takes another year for
the recovery to take hold to the point that the
Bank of England starts to tighten its policy rate,
should it do so with an eye to offset the
recessionary episode of above-target inflation?
Would we want the Bank of Canada to do so?
Perhaps a bit and maybe for a while, but the
bigger the amount of offset required the less
attractive such a policy would be. As for the
second example, there is the decades-long
Japanese-style deflationary trap; if the Canadian
economy should become similarly ensnared, at
some point a reset of the price-level-target path
might make sense.
Masson and Shukayev (2010) argue that history
supports the notion that large shocks (such as wars
or deep recessions) lead to a rebasing of the price-
level target. But an escape clause to the price-level
target can lead to self-fulfilling expectations and to
jumps between equilibria such that the stabilizing
effects of PLT are not as strong. Imperfect credibility
weakens and might even reverse some of the
theoretical advantages of PLT. One should admit,
then, that PLT would not eliminate long-horizon
inflation uncertainty and that it might have its
own unit root issues because some large shocks to
the price level would be accepted as permanent.
In conclusion, one of the theoretically most
important advantages of PLT over IT does not
stand up to closer inspection. The current IT
framework as implented by the Bank of Canada
appears to deliver substantial history dependence.
Deviations of the price-level path from the
implied expected path for the price level regularly
have been offset. Part of this success in maintaining 
a close link between the realized and the expected
path of the price level reflects the Bank’s actions
and part undoubtedly reflects luck. With modest
changes in the IT framework, one could reduce
the role played by luck, but one could not
eliminate all of the shocks that someday might
lead us to declare bygones really are bygones. In
theory, this lack of commitment to a price-level
path dampens the gains that could be obtained if
agents really believed that prices always would be
driven back to a target for the path of prices. But a
PLT regime would face the same credibility problem.
From the perspective of reducing medium-and
long-run inflation uncertainty, therefore, I see no
advantage to moving to a PLT regime.
The Zero Lower Bound 
It has long been believed that hitting the zero
lower bound (ZLB) for the policy rate would
greatly reduce the ability of the monetary
authority to stabilize the economy. Until as
recently as 2007, however, the mainstream
consensus was that it would be an extremely rare
event (see, for example, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
2007), so that no one had to worry about it.
Views have changed.
When, in April 2009, the policy rate fell to 25
basis points, which was deemed to be the effective
ZLB, the Bank of Canada outlined a series of
actions that it would take, if needed, to achieve its
inflation target. At the end of the day, it engaged
only one of these nonstandard actions: a “conditional
commitment” to keep the policy rate fixed at the
effective ZLB until the end of June 2010. The
commitment was conditional on the inflation
outlook, and Bank officers went to great lengths
to remind markets that the policy rate would be
raised if it was judged that not doing so would
lead to a path for inflation that would overshoot
the Bank’s 2 percent target.
Some serious empirical work needs to be done –
He (2010) provides an early attempt – but I
believe the conditional commitment was successful in
that it helped the Canadian economy to exit the
recession more quickly. The initial impact of the
announcement of the conditional commitment on
the yield curve was small, and it is unlikely that it
did very much to encourage firms or households
to spend more. As the recovery gathered steam,
however, the conditional commitment helped
assuage fears that the monetary authority would
start to raise the policy rate from its emergency
low level. It would be hard to capture the evidence| 6 Commentary 319
C.D. Howe Institute
formally, but I observed that good news in late
2009 and early 2010 often led rates farther along
the maturity or risk curve to creep up. But a
reminder from a senior officer that the Bank of
Canada stood behind its conditional commitment
was usually followed by a quick reversal of this
increase. By contributing to keep the yield curve
from drifting higher during its early phase, the
conditional commitment accelerated the recovery.
While helpful in reducing uncertainty about the
short-run path of the policy rate, the conditional
commitment left some important questions
unanswered. What would lead to an exit before
the end of June 2010? As the Bank made clear, the
outlook for inflation had to change, but by how
much? Some of the uncertainty was undoubtedly
related to being in an unfamiliar place for the first
time, but some was inherent in the vagueness of
the notion of what constituted a substantive
change in the inflation outlook.
While I argued above that the difference
between IT – with history dependence, as
practised by the Bank – and PLT was relatively
unimportant during normal times, the potential
advantages of PLT appear prominently when the
economy hits the ZLB. Under PLT, if the
economy hits the ZLB at the same time that
inflation is low, the Bank is committed to
producing inflation above the target 2 percent
path for a while so that it can return to its
deterministic target price path. Low nominal rates
are accompanied by even lower expected real rates.
Lower expected real rates provide a further
inducement not found in an IT framework for
firms and households to borrow and increase
demand. This makes it easier for the Bank to
escape the ZLB and less likely to hit it in the
first place.
Avoiding and escaping the difficulties of the
ZLB is one of the more attractive features of PLT
(see Amano and Shukayev 2010). A good
argument can be made that the gains at the ZLB
are large enough to tip the scales in favour of
moving from an IT to a PLT framework. But it
seems risky to give up a system that has worked
well for Canadians for almost two decades because
of concerns based on ZLB episodes, which we still
expect to be infrequent even under IT.
Can the current IT framework be modified in a
way that captures some of the gains of PLT at the
ZLB while avoiding most of the costs, risks, and
disadvantages of moving completely to a
PLT framework?
One approach would be to adopt more features
of the PLT framework “temporarily” at the ZLB.
For example, much as it did in 2009, the Bank of
Canada could announce a conditional commitment
to keep the policy rate fixed for a period of time.
But the conditionality could be based on year-
ahead forecasts that the path of the price level will
not cross a trajectory such as that given in Figure 2.
At the very least, this would bring welcome clarity
to the Bank’s conditional commitment.
Alternatively, the Bank could suspend IT and
instead state its objective to return the path of
prices to the trajectory given in Figure 2 while also
hitting its inflation target by the end of the
announced target period.
Temporarily increasing inflation expectations,
and therefore inflation, at the ZLB would
contribute to stabilizing the economy and would
be welfare improving. The trick would be to
convince agents in the economy that the higher
inflation that they would see was not permanent
and then to live up to that commitment. The first
approach above would allow the Bank of Canada
to tolerate higher inflation for a while, and
therefore to overshoot its target, while making it
clear that the Bank had well-defined limits on its
tolerance. The second suggestion is more
ambitious because it would require the Bank not
only to tolerate but to commit to generating
higher inflation temporarily.
The Target Rate of Inflation 
Both IT and PLT require a target rate of inflation.
Much ink has been spilled on what that target
should be. Commentators sometimes note that,
even with an inflation rate of 2 percent, the price
level doubles in approximately 35 years. WhyCommentary 319 | 7
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should that be costly? There is certainly a positive
link between the level and variance of inflation
that becomes increasingly apparent as inflation
rises, so it might be that concern about the level of
inflation comes about, in part, because of the costs
of inflation uncertainty. Perhaps a lower target for
inflation would reduce uncertainty about the
distribution of the price level 35 years into the future.
If one ignores the ZLB, then it is surprisingly
difficult to find convincing reasons to ignore the
Friedman rule, which says that private agents’
opportunity cost of holding money should be
equal to the social cost of producing money.
Because producing money is virtually costless, the
rule says that the nominal rate of interest should
be zero. Therefore, a small amount of deflation,
equal to the real rate of interest on short-term
assets that serve as close substitutes to money,
would be optimal. To overturn the Friedman rule,
one would need to find externalities or other
market failures that can be attenuated by
increasing inflation. 
In New Keynesian models, even perfectly
predictable inflation (or deflation) is costly.
Higher inflation leads to a wider distribution of
prices and wages for identical products and
workers, because prices and wages are changed
infrequently and not simultaneously. This leads to
a higher misallocation of resources and lower
welfare and a strong presumption in favour of
targeting an inflation rate of zero. There is plenty
of evidence that many nominal wages and prices
are changed infrequently – see, for example, Bils
and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson
(2008) – but it is not clear how costly this is.
Unfortunately, there is very little direct evidence
that the distribution of employment or demand
for goods across firms is much affected by the
relative wage and price distortions created by the
interaction of inflation with wage and price
stickiness. Buyers and sellers, and firms and
workers, who are in a repeated relationship can
use many other mechanisms besides the spot price
and wage to support their economic exchanges.
For example, benefits can be adjusted while
keeping wages fixed. And firms can speed up or
slow down delivery times or change the terms of
guarantees. So it is hard to evaluate whether
existing model-based estimates of the cost of
misallocated resources generated by the
interaction of inflation and sticky prices and
wages are credible. Of course, reducing the
estimated misallocation of resources associated
with inflation both lowers the optimal inflation
target and the costs of sticking with a target rate of
inflation that is higher than optimal.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010) survey a
number of standard models where the sources of
monetary nonneutrality stem from a demand for
money or sluggish price adjustment, including
those that provide an incentive for an inflation
tax. They conclude that it is difficult to find
support for a target rate of inflation much above
zero. Using a medium-scale macro model chosen
to match features of postwar US business cycles,
their point estimate of the optimal rate of
inflation is -0.4 percent, and their analysis
confidently predicts that a 1 percent target for
inflation is preferable to 2 percent. That said, the
welfare gains from reducing average inflation
below 2 percent seem modest. Coibon,
Gorodnichenko, and Wieland (2010) estimate
that the optimal rate of inflation falls in the range
0.4 to 2.1 percent, and their preferred estimate is
1.2 percent under IT but lower under PLT. They
estimate the welfare gains from reducing inflation
from 4 percent to the optimal rate would be the
same as increasing consumption in each period by
2 percent. But the gains from reducing inflation
from 2 percent would be about one-quarter that size.
Offsetting the uncertainty about the size of the
benefits of reducing the inflation target below 2
percent is the certainty of dealing with difficulties
at the ZLB. The lower the rate of inflation, the
more likely it is that the Canadian economy
would hit the ZLB and that the Bank would need
to implement nonstandard policy. A recent paper
published by the International Monetary Fund
(Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro 2010)| 8 Commentary 319
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suggests that a rate of 4 percent would help avoid
the difficulties that arise when an economy hits
the ZLB, but higher rates of inflation run the risk
of getting out of control.
8 In comparing the
benefits associated with better outcomes related to
the ZLB and the higher average cost incurred in
most periods that would come with a higher
inflation target, experience so far suggests the
latter is larger. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010)
argue that the ZLB is an extremely unlikely event
even with a zero-inflation target as long as
monetary policy is optimally implemented.
Nonetheless, the efficacy of monetary tools at the
ZLB leave much to be desired, which makes a
much lower inflation target less attractive.
Based on model predictions, a fairly strong case
can be made for lowering the inflation target
under IT to a number below 2 percent. However,
the size of the potential welfare gains are hard to
nail down, which gives pause, as there might be
transition costs not captured by the models or
unmodelled shocks, such as to the rate of time
preference, that might increase the probability of
hitting the ZLB. Although integer values have a
certain appeal, dropping the target to 1 percent at
the next renewal seems risky and would catch
many investors off guard. Reducing the target to
1.75 percent would hardly seem to justify the
effort, and changing the target to “below 2
percent” would capture the right direction but
might raise communication issues. The only
feasible choice for a new lower target under IT
would be 1.5 percent, with the door left open to
dropping it further to 1.0 percent at a subsequent
renewal if all went as expected. Should the new
monetary agreement go there?
Complicating the scenario are innovations
planned by Statistics Canada that will reduce the
measurement error in using the CPI as a measure
of the cost of living (see Smith 2010). The upshot
is that doing nothing and keeping the 2 percent
inflation target going forward would amount to a
modest increase in the true target rate of inflation.
A reduction in the announced CPI target rate of
inflation over the next five years would be required
just to maintain the current true target.
Simulations by Coibon, Gorodnichenko, and
Wieland (2010) suggest that, because it performs
better at the ZLB and reduces the odds of hitting
it, PLT can support a slightly lower target rate of
inflation than IT. And this combination leads to
substantively higher welfare.
The Time Horizon for a Return to Target 
A key factor in deciding whether or not to adopt
PLT is the time horizon that the Bank of Canada
should choose for returning to its target.
9
In the current IT framework, the Bank targets
the rate of inflation approximately six to eight
quarters into the future. Where does this horizon
come from? An important constraint is the “long
and variable lags” that characterize monetary
policy. It takes time for monetary actions to work
their way through the economy, and a very short
time horizon simply is not feasible. But there is
also a choice being made: one size does not fit all,
10
and the current time horizon provides the Bank
with considerable flexibility.
Moving to PLT would require an important
change in the announced horizon. Almost by
definition, the time horizon for a PLT framework
would have to be longer than that for an IT
framework. Imagine a shock that lowered inflation
below target. Unless monetary policy was more
aggressive than it would be under IT, the Bank
would require five or six quarters to get inflation
back to target in the event of a “normal shock.”
But then the Bank would require more time –
taking the horizon to perhaps 10 quarters, or even
as long as three or four years (see Smets 2003) – to
8 Crow (2009) discusses why a 4 percent inflation target is dangerous.
9 This was one of three issues identified as important before the 2006 renewal; see Bank of Canada (2006).
10 “Overall, the conclusion that the Bank has drawn from the research is that the present policy of bringing inflation back to target within a
horizon of six to eight quarters is still appropriate generally, although specific occasions may arise in which a somewhat shorter or longer time
horizon might be considered” (Bank of Canada 2006).Commentary 319 | 9
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generate the above-target inflation temporarily
needed to bring inflation back to the growing PLT
path. How could the public tell, over a period as
long as 10 quarters, if the Bank was hitting its
target? Over time, the Bank’s performance might
build credibility, but large risks would be
associated with the initial implementation period.
The risks might be smaller if the initial period
coincided with a ZLB episode, as the public might
be convinced that unusual times called for unusual
measures, and the Bank would have its full
attention. Problems of accountability and
credibility could become serious, however, if the
Bank were to announce a permanent move to PLT. 
In addition to IT and PLT, the literature has
explored hybrid alternatives. One is average-
inflation targeting (AIT), under which the Bank
of Canada would target the rate of inflation over a
longer interval – say, 24 months, rather than the
current 12 months. In simple models, AIT can
come close to achieving all the benefits of PLT, at
least in normal times (see Nessen and Vestin
(2005). But given its similarity to the current IT
framework, AIT might attenuate the communications
and accountability/commitment problems of
shifting all the way from IT to PLT.
Financial Stability 
Although the Canadian financial system
weathered the latest crisis reasonably well,
outcomes elsewhere were a wakeup call.
Canadians are proud of how their institutions
fared, but in their hearts most suspect they were
more than just a bit lucky. What can the monetary
policy agreement do to improve financial stability
and reduce the chances of a future financial meltdown?
In 2008, the Bank of Canada completed a
reorganization of its various departments that,
among other things, recognized a new emphasis
on financial stability. But what does that mean for
the Bank in practice? This is clearly an evolving
situation. The Bank has long had the unavoidable
role as lender of last resort. It also has a legal
responsibility to ensure the safe functioning of
Canada’s payments systems. But it is not – and as
far as I know, does not want to be – a regulator of
financial institutions. Price stability is clearly not
sufficient for financial stability. Does financial
stability conflict with the Bank’s goal for price
stability or can these two goals be pursued
independently using different policy tools?
Some argue that concern about stable prices, or
even about stable prices and stable output, is not
enough, and that the IT/PLT framework is too
restrictive to deal effectively with rare but
potentially devastating events. Experience
suggests, however, that the IT framework does not
impede the Bank of Canada’s ability to apply
judgment in response to extraordinary financial
shocks or other rare events. For example, the Bank
was quick to cut its policy rates after the 9/11
terrorist attacks to support the financial system
and build confidence. And, in response to the
financial crisis that followed the collapse of
Lehman Brothers, the Bank participated in an
internationally coordinated 50 basis point cut in
its target rate, outside of the usual cycle of fixed
announcement days.
A more subtle argument is that an IT/PLT
environment does not provide room to deal with
emerging financial strains because the focus on the
path of prices does not allow for other considerations
in choosing the policy rate. If the Bank has a
mandate for price stability, how can it justify
raising (or lowering) the policy rate when inflation
is at target and expected to stay there over the
policy horizon because of fears of future financial
stresses that might not be realized? Some even
argue that the IT/PLT framework itself can build
liquidity pressures that feed into asset-price
bubbles, or into imbalances in the current account
or elsewhere that require future adjustments. On
this basis, the argument goes, both IT and PLT
are flawed and might even contain the seeds of
financial instability.
Given the current state of knowledge about how
the economy works, the overnight interest rate is
not the appropriate tool to address speculative
excess. Other, better-suited tools are available, so it
makes sense to use monetary policy to focus on
inflation. The attack on the IT/PLT framework
based on financial stability considerations seems| 10 Commentary 319
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more like an attack on the models that are used to
guide policymakers, the horizon on which
policymakers focus, and the weight that is put on
rare events. IT and PLT are meant to be
approximations to a monetary policy that
maximizes welfare. Their strengths in
accountability and communication compensate
for tying our hands somewhat and having us give
up the small gains, at least in theory, from
attempting to pursue directly a welfare-
maximizing monetary policy regime. But if there
were compelling reasons to believe the
approximation was grossly inadequate, then of
course deviation would be necessary. Suppose the
Bank of Canada (or the US Federal Reserve or the
European Central Bank) had believed strongly in
2005 that a recession in 2008-10 could be
avoided if it changed its policy rate path for a year
or two – does anyone doubt that it would not
have done so, even if it meant missing its inflation
target temporarily? The problem is not that the IT
framework as practised in Canada precludes such
behaviour or that the Bank would face enormous
difficulties explaining why its focus was on
something other than the inflation target. Rather,
the problem is that the current state of knowledge
does not give us enough confidence that the risks
are real, or that manipulating the target rate
would help reduce these risks sufficiently, to
deviate from the inflation target.
Many deride what they see as an asymmetric
response by policymakers to potential crises. But
it makes sense to act more forcefully when one is
more certain of what to do. It is much easier to
recognize a crash than to see one coming. The
difficulty of predicting crises that threaten the real
economy should not be underestimated. It is not
enough to point out that we have ignored the
warnings of various Cassandras – history also
provides many examples of false positives (Y2K,
WMD, H1N1) where the actions taken look
costly ex post. Before the beginning of the latest
crisis, fears were focused on the risks from
unregulated hedge funds or a collapse in
confidence of the US dollar, neither of which has
been realized so far.
Although I have little sympathy with the notion
of using monetary policy to address individual
and specific risks, it might have a role to play in
moderating the credit cycle (see White 2009). The
credit cycle is a recurring process in which
increasing liquidity feeds into asset prices, which
increase the value of collateral, which, in turn,
bids up the prices of assets even more. In the
downturn, the opposite occurs, often leading to
“fire sales.” The credit cycle displays the classic
failure of markets in the presence of externalities,
and so a role for policy is warranted (Jeanne and
Korinek 2010). For the most part, this unwanted
procyclicality in credit standards is best handled
by financial regulators, because manipulating the
policy rate is too crude to achieve the first-best
outcome. But markets often manage to find ways
to work around even the most diligent regulators,
and it might be that the policy rate still has a role
to play (Giavazzi and Giovannini 2010).
Both IT and PLT have features that lean against
asset-price bubbles and contribute to financial
stability. Other than the longer horizon, and
therefore the potential for greater flexibility,
afforded by PLT (see Carney 2009), I can see no
reason to debate whether one or the other is more
conducive to financial stability. Although it is not
on the table as part of the monetary policy
agreement between the government of Canada
and the Bank of Canada, financial stability
concerns do call for a more formal role for the
Bank as a macroprudential regulator. There might
be good reasons to have the Department of
Finance maintain the key role – when things go
bad, only the government can write cheques. The
current arrangement, however, just will not do.
We need to clarify the responsibilities and roles of
each of the major players responsible for financial
stability (see Le Pan 2009).
Communication 
Economic models do not provide much guidance
about how best to transmit the information that
the public and markets need to form their
expectations about the Bank of Canada’s actions.Commentary 319 | 11
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A cursory glance at the journals or listening to an
interview is sufficient to show that economists
have no comparative advantage when it comes to
sending clear and intelligible signals. Yet, economists
understand that communicating with the public
and the markets is important, so that they can
understand what the Bank is doing and why.
Clear communication is not quite the same as
transparency. Too much information can lead to a
kind of processing overflow that causes important
messages to be lost in the noise. As an educator, I
learned early on what one of my senior colleagues
meant when he said, “The most important
decision you make as a teacher is what not to talk
about.”
11 It should not require a PhD in
economics and many hours of careful study to
separate the noise from the signal and figure out
what the Bank is up to. The monetary policy
framework should be easy for the Bank to
summarize and for the public to understand.
From a communication perspective, there are
real advantages to sticking with IT. After almost
two decades, the Bank has honed its communication
strategy under IT – it is a familiar environment,
and the track record of what was said and what
subsequently happened makes it relatively easy for
the Bank to get its message across.
Moving to PLT, on the other hand, would
involve a number of communication challenges.
With a new monetary policy framework, both the
Bank and the public would have to learn a new
language and what it meant. This inevitably
would cause some frustration and missed signals.
Keeping the public informed under PLT would
seem intrinsically harder as well.  Given the long
horizon involved, it would be harder under PLT
than under IT for the Bank to communicate
where it was heading and why the process was
taking so long, or why events had intervened to
elongate the process, without losing the public's
confidence that the Bank can be trusted to keep
its word.
Communication difficulties are, however,
surmountable. The Bank is able to communicate
very well with the public, no matter how new or
unusual the policy, as long as it understands why
it has chosen a specific action and firmly believes
that it is the right thing to do.
Loose Ends 
Although they come under the purview of the
Bank of Canada alone and are not part of the
monetary policy agreement, several important
technical issues will matter for the choice of IT 
or PLT.
The Price Index 
Which price level should the Bank target? The
CPI has a well-known bias toward overestimating
the cost of living. The index measures the cost of
purchasing a fixed bundle of goods over time. As
some goods become more expensive, households
will choose cheaper substitutes, so the CPI suffers
from subsitution bias. Other biases come from the
introduction of new goods, price increases that
reflect quality improvements, and the
introduction of cheaper retail channels. Rossiter
(2005) estimates the total bias averages about 0.6
percent per year – large relative to the 2 percent
target increase in the annual CPI, and it provides
some justification for not reducing the inflation
target further. Improvements by Statistics Canada
over the next few years will reduce the total bias
(see Smith 2010), albeit by an unknown amount,
but it still removes the status quo as an option for
the inflation target. Keeping the 2 percent target
for the CPI while ignoring improvements in
measurement would amount to a stealth increase
of as much as 0.5 percent in the true inflation target. 
Smith (2009) provides a useful survey of
alternative price indices. An important
consideration is to decide if we simply want a
better measure of the cost of living, or if the
objective is to identify those prices that are
particularly “sticky” and target them in the short
and medium run, pretty much ignoring
movement in relative prices of markets where
11 A more elegant variation of this rule is credited to Miles Davis: “It’s not the notes you play, it's the notes you don’t play.”| 12 Commentary 319
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prices appear fairly flexible. Smith (2009) argues
in favour of the former. He also suggests working
with Statistics Canada to develop a new, timely,
superlative price index – that is, a price index free
of substition bias. He does not recommend,
however, that the Bank construct its own price
index as a target. After considering existing
alternatives, or minor tweaks to them, Smith,
correctly in my opinion, concludes that there is no
compelling alternative to the CPI.
As a guide to decisionmaking, the Bank of
Canada looks at a variety of measures, including
core inflation, trimmed means or weighting series
by their standard deviations, and movements in
inflation of higher frequency than just year over
year, as well as surveys of inflation expectations.
Deciding what to do when these various
alternatives move in different directions is never
easy, and so far has been left to judgment.
Communicating with the public, however, places
an important and often useful constraint on this
judgment: if you cannot explain why this time the
secondary measures of inflation are raising red
flags when you have not made much reference to
them in the past, then you cannot respond much
to these alternative measures of inflation unless
they are sending strong and very unusual signals.
Asset prices can also be used to predict
inflation.
12 The Bank regularly looks at a measure
of long-term inflation expectations based on
breakeven rates from real return bonds, adjusted
to try to attentuate fluctuations in inflation-risk
premiums. Smith (2009) recommends supporting
the development of a richer array of inflation-
linked bonds as a means of getting measures of
market-based expectations of inflation. In a similar
vein, I would point out that the development of an
active market in inflation-indexed swaps (see
Hurd and Rellen 2006) would be useful as a way
to get market-based estimates of inflation
expectations and to measure how much the public
is willing to pay to avoid inflation uncertainty.
In theory, PLT could lead us to use a different
price index than IT. Murchison (2010) argues,
however, that, under PLT, “the overall CPI would
represent close to an ideal index to target.”
Transparency 
The adoption of IT has led to a dramatic increase
in transparency at the Bank of Canada. Has it
gone far enough?
13
The Bank’s Governing Council currently
publishes its forecast for inflation and output,
along with the path for potential output, four
times per year in the Monetary Policy Report. I
would like to see it go further and also publish the
staff’s recommendation for the policy rate path
and the staff’s projection of the path for inflation
and output conditional on its recommendation.
Among the arguments for not publishing a path
for the policy rate is that markets would have
difficulty understanding the conditionality of the
path and that making the staff’s recommendations
and projections public would somehow commit
the Governing Council.
On the latter point, it is well understood that
the staff does not make monetary policy.
Regarding the former, I have some sympathy with
the notion that markets are easily distracted by
“bright and shiny” things and might lose the
nuance and conditionality that the Governing
Council would like to convery. For that reason, I
propose that the staff’s recommendations and
projections be published with a lag of, say, six
months, and without comment. What could be
gained? Over time, markets and households could
be trained to understand the conditionality of the
forecast and to interpret the information
appropriately. And they would gain valuable
information that would help them make better
decisions. Also, publication would provide the
benefits and checks that we see in the open
software movement. Specialists could evaluate the
12 Smith (2009) argues against including asset prices as part of the price index that is directly targeted.
13 For a lively and deeper discussion of this issue, see Siklos and Spence (2010).Commentary 319 | 13
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quality of the information provided by Bank staff,
and the value added by the Governing Council to
the staff forecast, and contribute to improving 
that information.
Target Bands 
When it first introduced IT, the Bank frequently
refered to its inflation target as a band, which has
been between 1 and 3 percent since late 1995. But
in recent years, it has featured the mid-point of 2
percent more prominently in its communications
and has emphasized that its target is the midpoint
of its band. Originally, it was hoped that the
emphasis on the band would provide a sort of
“confidence interval” that the public could use in
forming its expectations. It was not clear if the
Bank could regularly keep inflation inside its
band, so the emphasis on the target band also
reflected some humility. But the Bank turned out
to be much more successful at hitting the 2
percent midpoint than it had expected, and at
some point it became comfortable with stressing
the midpoint as the target. In recent years, the role
of the band has become fuzzy and maybe even
problematic. It might be time to drop discussion
of the band entirely. Alternatively, the band could
be narrowed and used for other purposes – for
example, the band could be announced as 1.75-
2.00 percent if the Bank wanted to commit to
target less than 2 percent inflation, in order, say, to
return the price level to a target path. 
The Effective Lower Bound 
In spring 2009, the Bank lowered its policy rate to
25 basis points, which it declared to be the
effective lower bound for the overnight rate. The
Bank feared that a lower value for its policy rate
would cause disruptions in the overnight market,
impeding liquidity. With no return to overnight
lending, banks might even choose to shut down
their desks, perhaps resulting in a loss of human
capital that could make the conduct of monetary
policy difficult after the ZLB episode ended. We
now have some historical experience to guide us.
Were these fears justified? Was 25 basis points too
low, or could the Bank have gone even lower?
Uncertainty 
The Bank uses a fairly primitive apparatus to
incorporate the consequences of uncertainty for
making monetary policy. Current practice is to
put together a base-case projection and then to
identify, but not formally quantify, a small
number of specific risks to this projection.
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The sources of uncertainty are myriad, and
include model uncertainty and, for any given
model, parameter uncertainty and the distribution
of future shocks. If shocks are small and
nonlinearities are not very important, then
focusing on the base case is approximately optimal.
But there have been many times over the past few
years when these conditions were not satisfied.
Two examples will suffice.
In mid-2008, inflation was breaching the upper
bound of the Bank’s 1-3 percent target range. At
the same time, credit default swap rates were
sending ominous messages about a financial
meltdown. Financial armaggedon, although not of
neglible probability, was not part of the base case.
Ignoring the benefits of hindsight, we can
legitimately ask: What should the Bank do in such
a situation? Should it fight the clear and present
danger of inflation and raise the policy rate? Or
should it cut the policy rate as an insurance policy?
Looking at the state of the world at the time of
this writing, the base case is that the Canadian
economy will continue to recover, excess capacity
will be absorbed, and pressures on the price level
will increase over the next year. But there are risks
– from rising household indebtedness and frothy
house prices, among others. Should the Bank
modify the path of the policy rate from that
dictated by the base-case scenario?
14 Since the April 2009 Monetary Policy Report, the Bank has also published fan charts for core and total inflation. These provide a measure of
the uncertainty in the evolution of these two variables, given a path for the policy rate implicit in ToTEM.| 14 Commentary 319
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At the end of the day, both IT and PLT gain
their legitimacy from our belief that they are good
and accountable approximations to maximizing
welfare. But in situations where either IT or PLT
would lead to decisions that conflict in an
important way with maximizing welfare, then
they should be suspended. Concerns about large
shocks, nonlinearities, and rare events might or
might not lead to a conflict. But the Bank needs
the tools to identify when to be worried about
deviations from the base-case scenario. Steering
between Scylla and Charybdis is never easy, but
having the best navigation equipment cannot hurt.
Recommendations 
The Bank of Canada’s IT framework is not
broken. It has a proven track record over almost
20 years, “which has shown its worth in both
turbulent and tranquil times. This represents a
relatively high bar against which any future
changes must be judged” (Murray 2010). The
Bank’s researchers, however, have slowly
accumulated a modestly convincing collection of
arguments that PLT should work even better – at
least once the public gets used to the new
monetary policy regime – and that a lower target
rate of inflation would benefit Canadians. But the
projected welfare gains are not large, and they
must be weighed against the transition costs of
moving to a new regime and the risk that the
gains predicted in theory are not realized in
practice. What should we do? Fortune favours the
bold, but she can be unkind to the reckless.
In my opinion, the long horizon to return to
the target path required under PLT makes it
currently a very unattractive choice. Horizons of
three years (or more) strain accountability and
require an enormous amount of confidence in the
Bank by the public. Rather than an “either or”
choice, I believe the right strategy is to keep the
current IT framework but to adapt it slightly to
achieve some of the more important gains
available under PLT. At a minimum, I recommend
the following steps be taken. 
Incorporate Past Deviations in Choosing Future
Inflation Targets
Since inflation targets were first announced in
1991, there have been four renewals of the
monetary policy agreement (1993, 1998, 2001,
2006) and there  will soon be a fifth. In principle,
renewals could be a source of important
uncertainty. Will the agreement be renewed or
will we return to our previous arrangement where
the Bank of Canada chooses its goals as well as the
means to achieve them? If the agreement is
renewed, what will be the new inflation target?
Will other important features of the monetary
policy regime be affected? Although I do not
believe it has been a problem up to now, it’s not
clear how the public can be expected to form
expectations about these various outcomes.
History suggests that we should not expect the
Bank to make substantive changes unless there are
important improvements in our understanding of
monetary policy that make a compelling reason
for change, or unless events expose hitherto
unknown failings of the IT framework. This
provides enormous inertia to renewing the 2
percent inflation target.
The most important payoff to announcing that
future inflation targets will reflect past deviations
from target is that it could lead to a reduction in
medium- and long-horizon inflation uncertainty.
As shown in Figure 2, the current IT framework
has achieved a price path that is indistinguishable
from that of PLT. But because it is not viewed as a
commitment, some of the benefits of this price
stability have been lost. Incorporating PLT
considerations into the renewal of the IT
framework would give agents more confidence
about the price level 10 to 20 years in the future.
Moreover, if something in the IT framework
actually generated a return to the price-level target
path, but we just did not understand what it was,
then the reduced uncertainty would come for free.
To support the importance of incorporating
past deviations in the determination of future
inflation targets, it would be useful if the Bank
regularly published an update to Figure 2, perhaps
annually in the Monetary Policy Report.Announce the Temporary Adoption of PLT at the ZLB
One of the clearest advantages of PLT over IT
occurs when the economic conditions are such
that the policy rate is near or at the ZLB. If the
Bank does not move to a PLT framework entirely,
then it should announce that it would implement
some sort of PLT if it ever hit the ZLB. Some
might believe that switching between IT and PLT
at the ZLB would be confusing to the public, but
one episode has already made clear that the Bank
must and can use different tools at the ZLB. The
Bank’s “conditional commitment” proved to be a
useful tool in the latest crisis, but the exit
condition was too vague: what does “conditional
on the outlook for inflation” mean?
In future episodes, I would like to see the Bank
make a stronger statement, in the form of “we will
keep the policy rate at the (effective) zero lower
bound until DATE X unless the projected path six
quarters ahead for the price level crosses PATH Y.”
Higher inflation expectations – and, therefore,
higher inflation – at the ZLB would lower real
rates, encourage households and firms to borrow
and to purchase consumer and producer durables,
and help the real economy recover. The Bank has
a higher tolerance for inflation at the ZLB and
should signal this. It need not give a commitment
to generate inflation above the target, but it
should signal a willingness to allow above-target
inflation temporarily, with a constraint given by a
target path for the price level of the sort given by
Figure 2. A price-level target, or even an “upper
bound,” would also be helpful if the Bank found
itself in a situation similar to that of the United
Kingdom, with a compelling reason to tolerate
higher-than-target inflation up to a point in order
to support an economic recovery.
15 Given that we
would like the Bank to have the opportunity to
deviate temporarily from its inflation target at the
ZLB, this should be included as part of the agreement.
Lower the Inflation Target
There is no good reason to choose a 2 percent
inflation target, even if we take into account the
difficulty of conducting monetary policy at the
ZLB. The Bank’s senior officers have made it clear
that they have ruled out increasing the inflation
target, while research at the Bank has generated a
strong presumption that welfare would be
improved if a lower rate of inflation were targeted.
But fear of the unknown and the lack of
compelling evidence on the costs of inflation
threaten to make the 2 percent target almost
immutable even though it was originally intended
to be a stop on the path to even further price
stability. Events are now forcing our  hand by
ruling out the status quo. Welcome improvements
by Statistics Canada to the calculation of the CPI
mean that aiming at a measure of 2 percent
inflation over the next few years would amount to
accepting a stealth increase in the true rate of
inflation. To offset this and to test its own
research, the Bank should move to a target of 1.5
percent over the next renewal period, with the
expectation of a further reduction in the target to
1.0 percent at the subsequent renewal.
Consider the Credit Cycle in Choosing the Policy Rate
Regulation should be the first tool to deal with the
credit cycle. But markets evolve quickly, and the
Bank might need to stretch its flexibility under
either IT or PLT on occasion and use its policy
rate to help moderate the credit cycle. The Bank is
clearly concerned with this source of
procyclicality. If it became convinced that there
was a problem, I am sure it could find the means
within its mandate to act and that it would have
little difficulty explaining its conviction to the public.
Commentary 319 | 15
15 Under its IT mandate, the Bank of England acted as if the United Kingdom’s 3.5 percent inflation rate in the second quarter of 2010 was a
cause of concern to the point that it cited special factors and reassuringly predicted a decline over the next year back to target. Theory
suggests that the central bank should justify the benefits of keeping inflation high for a while in order to generate expectations of lower real
rates of interest in the future.
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The biggest potential gains from changing the
Bank of Canada’s monetary policy framework
would come from increasing its contribution to
financial stability. Unfortunately, economists do
not know enough to make any major progress in
that direction. We can ask the Bank to pay more
attention to the credit cycle and the potential for
regulation to fail to control risks due to excessive
leverage that could expose the real economy to
system-wide fragility. But we have to move
cautiously. The system works, and we do not want
to risk our hard-won gains. We will have to wait
for more research and the next monetary policy
renewal before we can suggest more substantive
changes to the way the Bank uses monetary policy
to improve financial stability. 
At the same time, we have long thought about
other, less dramatic changes to the monetary
policy framework. I agree that we should do no
more than tinker with the current system, but
tinkering has its rewards. My recommendations
have only a small upside potential for improving
welfare, but the downside risks are even smaller.
And there are reasons to experiment: only some
real-world experience will help us decide if we
should move the inflation target closer to zero or
adopt more features of PLT into our monetary
policy framework. Even taking a few small steps
would provide useful information. And that might
help us make a bolder decision when the
agreement comes up for renewal again. 
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